This paper contributes to the emerging empirical literature on penny auctions, a particular type of all-pay auctions. We focus on the potential learning e¤ects that bidders may experience over time but also (and particularly) across auctions as a result of their auction participation. Using detailed bid-level information, we …nd that, similarly to earlier literature, bidders su¤er from a sunk cost fallacy, whereby their probability of dropping out of an auction is decreasing in the number of bids they have already placed in that auction. Whilst we do …nd that learning through repeated participation alleviates the sunk cost fallacy, participation in simultaneous penny auctions emerges as a much more e¤ective learning mechanism, ultimately contributing towards bidders earning higher individual surpluses.
Introduction
The penny auction was popularized by …rms like Swoopo and is still used by online auction companies, as well as by traditional retailers across the world. 1 In a penny auction, bidding usually starts at zero and bidders must pay a bid cost to increase the sale price by a small amounttypically one penny, hence the name of the auction. 2 A key attraction of this type of auction is the possibility of paying substantially less than the retail price for an object. However, this does not necessarily mean the auctioneer has made a loss. For instance, if each bid in a penny auction costs $1 to place, an iPad with a retail price of $500 which is sold for $75 in a penny auction yields a revenue of $7575 to the auctioneer ($7500 from bid costs plus $75 from the actual sale price) and a substantial pro…t margin. Indeed, the recent interest in penny auctions has been driven both by its popularity as an e-commerce mechanism, as well as by the empirically observed high pro…t margins -a clear violation of auction theory (expected revenue should equal the good's value) and yet another real-world example of overbidding in auctions.
The standard game theoretical analysis assumes players arrive at a Nash equilibrium through an introspective process, in which they form beliefs about their opponents' actions, and beliefs about their opponents'beliefs about their own actions, and so on. While real people may be able to engage in this type of mental process in simple games with few players and with a unique Nash equilibrium, it is less reasonable to expect this to be true in more complex games with many players and multiple equilibria, as is the case of penny auctions. Instead, as already suggested in the penny auction literature, which we review below, it may be that repeated experience (over time, within a given auction or in subsequent auctions) in this type of game allows players to learn what the optimal strategy is (or at least allows players to identify and use payo¤-enhancing strategies).
However, a dimension which has thus far been ignored is the potential contribution that participation in simultaneous auctions has in this learning process. Indeed, 'experience'may be obtained 'vertically', over time through bid submission or auction participation, but also 'horizontally', within a time window but through bid submission or simultaneous participation in more than one auction.
Theoretically (Mertens, 1992) one would expect such parallel auctions to be independent and thus not a¤ect bidding behavior; in reality it may actually speed up the bidders'learning process. To the best of our knowledge, this is a little-explored subject in the economics literature. 3 In penny auctions, bidders are learning a complex object. We conjecture that by virtue of participating in concurrent auctions with di¤erent types of bidders, or even by bidding in auctions at di¤erent stages, subjects can learn (i) how to play a particular optimal strategy, or learn that (ii) there are potentially di¤erent optimal strategies faster than if they only take part in one auction.
There is a small (experimental) literature on behavioral spillovers which is somewhat related to these learning e¤ects. Cason et al. (2012) consider a behavioral spillover to exist when observed behavior in a game is di¤erent depending on whether that game is played together with other games or in isolation and acknowledge that learning e¤ects can be a source of such spillovers. 4 With the objective of analyzing such learning e¤ects, we study data from 403 penny auctions conducted by a telecommunications operator between June and December 2011. 5 Our database of- 3 In neuroscience, Sigman et al. (2008) show the coexistence of serial and parallel brain processes during the performance of a cognitive task. Gombrich (2011) puts forward a tentative de…nition of series learning (equivalent to our 'vertical' learning) as opposed to parallel learning (equivalent to our 'horizontal' learning), borrowing from the working of electric circuits: through series learning, one learns one thing after another to arrive at a total amount of knowledge, whilst through parallel learning one learns several things at the same time to arrive at the same amount of total knowledge. In the machine learning (and arti…cial neural networks) literature, Caruana (1995) proposes and tests several mechanisms through which neural nets learning through multiple related tasks can outperform sequential learning, as it enables a more generalizable representation of a particular feature. Wason (1960) pioneered the paradigm of rule discovery, which studies how humans develop hypotheses from observing data from unknown data generation processes. This is also illustrated well by Baxter (1995) , who points out that engaging in multiple tasks enables learning more general representations of concepts. 4 In particular, Cason et al. (2012) look at (two di¤erent) coordination games and …nd strong spillovers when the games are played sequentially, but not when they are played simultaneously. In the same vein, Falk et al. (2013) analyze two identical and completely independent (coordination or public good) games, played simultaneously, and also …nd no evidence of behavioral spillovers. By contrast, Bednar et al. (2012) do …nd spillovers when (two di¤erent) games are played simultaneously, but these games are di¤erent from Cason et al. (2012) . 5 The operator requested its identity not to be disclosed.
fers distinct advantages to study the role of learning through participation in simultaneous auctions.
The telecommunications operator auctions o¤ essentially …ve types of items: mobile phones, tablet PCs, laptops, mobile services (e.g., games, etc.) and USB pens for mobile internet access. Whilst certainly di¤erentiated within each type, these items belong to a relatively homogeneous category of products: devices and/or services which may enhance users'bene…ts from their current mobile subscriptions. In that sense, these auctions may attract a relatively homogeneous set of potential bidders and this appears to be adequate to study learning e¤ects. By comparison, Swoopo or other major penny auction websites sell a wider variety of items to certainly more heterogeneous bidders.
We …nd that the telecommunications operator has an average pro…t margin of 219%: it obtains an average revenue of e1,224 per auctioned item, whose average retail price is e370. There is signi…cant dispersion in pro…t margins (including large negative pro…t margins), and its distribution exhibits positive skewness and is, thus, right-tailed. Our detailed bid-level dataset allows us to investigate drivers of bidding behavior. First, we analyze the decision to participate in a penny auction and …nd that the probability of participation by an individual bidder is decreasing with the number of simultaneous auctions and bidder experience -evidence of both vertical and horizontal learning e¤ects. Second, we investigate what determines the likelihood of an active bidder dropping out of the auction. We …nd evidence of Augenblick's (2016) sunk cost fallacy in our data: the probability of an individual bidder leaving an auction decreases with the number of bids she has already placed in that auction. However, experience contributes signi…cantly towards alleviating it (as in Augenblick, 2016) , as does -to a more noticeable extent -the simultaneous participation in more than one penny auction, suggesting that horizontal learning may be more e¤ective than vertical learning. This empirical evidence appears to support the existence of behavioral spillovers, both when auctions are conducted sequentially, as well as simultaneously, and the latter is in contrast with the (experimental) evidence of Falk et al. (2013) . 6 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contextualizes our paper in the literature. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 contains the main analysis. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains additional material.
Literature review
The literature on penny auctions is relatively recent. Augenblick (2016) proposes a tractable penny auction model, for which he obtains a Markov perfect equilibrium. He uses auction-level and bidlevel data from Swoopo to show that the sunk cost fallacy (as bidders spend more money on bids, they become more reluctant to leave the auction although the bidding costs are sunk) explains the persistence of auction participation above and beyond the prediction of the normative model. In turn this provides a rationale for the observed high and positive (51%) average pro…t margins in Swoopo auctions. Bidders apparently learn how to use more e¤ective bidding strategies (including aggressive bidding strategies), but such learning takes place at a very slow rate and requires a large number of submitted bids (and consequently high losses). Hinnosaar (2014) provides an alternative analysis of the penny auction game and shows that there are multiple symmetric, stationary, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. Platt et al. (2013) analyze a penny auction model which explicitly allows bidders to have risk-loving preferences (rather than the traditional assumption of risk neutrality), in an attempt to explain excess pro…ts. Using data from Swoopo, they …nd that bidding patterns are consistent with some degree of risk lov- 
Data description
The data used in this paper consists of penny auctions conducted by a telecommunications operator roughly on a monthly basis for a period of …ve working days which we de…ne as 'auction week'. 8 On average, there are approximately 10 penny auctions in each day of the auction week. Auction weeks were advertised in advance on the operator's website as well as through targeted emails, blogs, social networks and other websites. Bidding was restricted to that operator's subscribers and could be done through SMS or through the operator's auction website.
The operator's website displayed all of the day's penny auctions, as well as each auction's starting time. Typically, each auction started 30 minutes after the previous one began. Mobile phones were the most commonly auctioned item, but laptops, tablet PCs, USB pens for broadband wireless access and services (e.g., one year of free SMS, 6 months of free online gaming, etc.) were also auctioned. For each auction, a detailed description of the item was provided, including its main characteristics, as well as its retail price.
All auctions shared the following features: auctions were conducted in euros (e), the starting price was e0 and the auction …nishing time was set for one hour after its start; each bidder placed bids, which raised the current high bid by a …xed e0.01 increment; each bid placed had a nonrefundable bid cost of e0.50 (charged directly to the bidder's phone bill). All bids placed within the …rst hour of the auction did not change its …nishing time; however, all bids placed after the initial one hour period extended the auction …nishing time by one minute. The winning bidder was whoever held the current high bid once the auction reached its …nishing time. The winning bidder's total auction cost for the good was the number of bids placed times the bid cost plus the …nal auction price. All other bidders forfeited their bidding costs.
After each auction …nished, the operator posted on the website the auction duration, …nal price, the di¤erence between …nal price and retail price, and the bid, time of bid and identity of the bidder for the last …ve bids (including the auction winner). This information was publicly available until the start of the following auction week (roughly for a one-month period) and we manually collected it for 414 auctions pertaining to seven auction weeks between June and December 2011.
In addition to this, we contacted the operator in order to obtain more detailed bid-level data, which includes, for each auction, the time of the bid and the (numeric) identity of the bidder. In total, we received bid level information for all 414 auctions in the auction database, totaling 956,742 bids placed by 38,733 unique bidders. A closer inspection of the two databases revealed a 'coverage' problem, which has led us to exclude 11 auctions from the analysis and focus on 403 auctions, for which we have 940,968 bids placed by 38,000 unique bidders in the bid level database. 9 Table 6 (Appendix A) presents the descriptive statistics of the auction-level database. On average, the …nal auction price was e24.01 and bid costs yielded e1,200.50 in revenue, which means that, using as a reference the average retail price of e369.97, each auction yielded a net pro…t of e854.77 -a pro…t margin of 219%. 10 Figure 1 (Appendix A) shows that some auctions present negative (and large, in absolute value) pro…t margins, but others yield extremely high pro…t margins. There is also some variability across auction weeks and between item types. On average, there are 6.88 auctions active at the same time (simultaneous auctions) and, in each auction, 2,401 bids were placed by 439 unique bidders. Table 7 (Appendix A) presents the descriptive statistics of the bid-level database, which contains 176,908 unique bidder-auction combinations.
9 Note that the auction-level database, by registering the …nal bid, allows us to infer the total number of bids placed in each auction because each bid increment is …xed and equal to e0.01. Comparing the total number of bids in each auction both in the auction-level as well as in the bid-level database, we noted that the latter typically contained fewer bids than suggested by the former. This problem was particularly acute for 11 auctions in the original sample. In 10 out of these 11 auctions, the coverage was below 30%. We suspect that this may have been due to an error in the bid-registering software (the operator could not explain this), as all these 11 excluded auctions occurred on a given day (14th December 2011) and the missing bid-level observations related to bids placed after 7pm. The average coverage of these 403 auctions was 97.2%. The coverage problem was widespread and a¤ected 76% of these 403 auctions -that is, the two databases only coincided fully for 24% of all auctions. But in most cases, the di¤erences were relatively small -basically a few missing bids from the bid level database for each auction (the median is 8 missing bids per auction), which could be explained by small errors in the operator's registering procedure: 44.5% of auctions were missing less than 1% of bids; 57% were missing less than 2%; and 66.5% were missing less than 5%. Therefore, only 9.5% of auctions had missing bids in excess of 5%.
1 0 The average pro…t margin in our dataset (219%) is clearly higher than in Augenblick (2016) (51%). This could be associated with the type of good most frequently auctioned in our dataset: mobile phones account for 85% of total auctions. Augenblick Figure 3 ) present evidence of an average pro…t margin of 86%, with the item that is more frequently auctioned obtaining an average pro…t margin of 365% (Wii Play with Wii Remote). Goodman (2012 , Table 3 ) provides a breakdown of average pro…t margins by bid increment and by good value: although the average (overall) pro…t margin is 67%, for some bid increments (2 cents and 6 cents) it is higher than that -126% and 132% respectively -, and, for those same increments and for goods whose value is in the $25-$50 range, it is even higher (477% and 240% respectively). Therefore, although average pro…t margins in our dataset's penny auctions are higher than in Swoopo auctions, there are several instances in which the latter yield comparable or even higher pro…t margins.
Analysis and results

Auction level analysis
Using data from the auction-level database, we wish to understand the main drivers of …nal prices in penny auctions. The auction price is, in e¤ect, a duration-type variable: higher auction prices indicate, according to the bidding rules, longer durations and, because we have normalized auction prices by dividing them by the retail price of the auctioned item (as suggested by Augenblick, 2016), we can compare the durations of auctions of di¤erent items. 11 On this basis, we have estimated a model assuming the Gompertz and the Weibull distributions for the hazard rates, as well as Cox's partial likelihood model (which places no restrictions on the shape of the baseline hazard rate). 12;13 As potential explanatory variables we have included: (i) the average number of simultaneous auctions; (ii) the number of normalized (divided by the retail price) …rst hour bids; 14 (iii) the auction week in question; (iv) the type and (v) brand of the auctioned item; (vi) the number of unique bidders; and (vii) a Her…ndahl-Hirschman concentration index of unique bidders' bids. Table 9 displays the results of our estimations.
First, note that all models produce very similar estimates, which is somewhat reassuring. Second, the exponentiated (signi…cant) coe¢ cient of the average number of simultaneous auctions 1 1 In order to establish a parallel with survival analysis, we refer to the normalized auction prices as 'normalized time'. Figure 2 (in Appendix A) presents the estimated (smoothed) hazard rate using a kernel with a bandwidth of 2, where we can see that the hazard rate appears to be (almost always) increasing with normalized time; in Figure  2 , we have also plotted the logarithm of the cumulative hazard against that of normalized time. The fact that we obtain a relatively straight line suggests that the underlying hazard rate in the data could be coming from a Weibull distribution. 1 2 We have estimated the hazard rates for each parametric distribution and for each model and obtained their respective Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC). This method takes into account a model's log-likelihood, but also the number of covariates and the number of model-speci…c parameters (see Akaike, 1974 , or Cleves et al., 2010, p. 281, on its application for survival analysis). We have thus identi…ed the two parametric distributions with lower AIC scores in Table 8 (Appendix A). The Weibull and the Gompertz distributions emerge as sensible candidates.
indicates that, all else constant, an additional simultaneous auction increases the baseline hazard rate by 21-27%. Third, the number of normalized …rst hour bids signi…cantly decreases the hazard rate (by 81-88%), i.e., …rst hour bidding activity is an important explanatory factor of auction duration. And, …nally, all else constant, an additional unique bidder decreases the hazard rate by 0.5%. Relating these results to our main research question, we …nd that, at the auction level:
Observation 1: Auction duration varies inversely with the number of simultaneous auctions.
This could be interpreted as a supply-induced e¤ect (more simultaneous auctions could induce a …xed number of constrained bidders to bid less) or as a …rst hint for the existence of (aggregate) horizontal learning e¤ects (if the supply-induced e¤ect is small).
Bid level analysis 4.2.1 Decision to participate in an auction
We have used the bid-level database to construct a balanced panel with 15,314,000 observations, which includes all unique bidders (38,000) in all auctions (403). In that panel, the dummy variable 'participate'takes on the value of 1 if bidder i participated in auction j and 0 otherwise.
Our purpose is to look deeper into the motivation of each bidder to participate in an auction.
In addition to the average number of simultaneous auctions, the auction week in question, the type and brand of the auctioned item, we also consider three additional variables: the retail price, the number of bids previously submitted by each bidder (in other auctions) and the number of auctions previously won by each bidder. The number of previously submitted bids is of particular interest for two reasons: on the one hand, because it entails a cost, bidders who have already submitted many bids prior to auction j may be (relatively more) …nancially constrained and hence decide not to participate in that auction; on the other hand, it is clearly a proxy for bidder experience (as in Augenblick, 2016 , or Goodman, 2012 . Moreover, we have adapted the variables related to the Table 1 contains the results of a random-e¤ects probit speci…cation, with 'participate' as the dependent variable. The results are presented as marginal e¤ects evaluated at the mean. Almost all variables are statistically signi…cant and the coe¢ cients'signs appear plausible. 16 For instance, a higher retail price increases the probability of bidder participation, whilst a higher number of simultaneous auctions decreases it. Interestingly, the probability of a bidder participating in an auction is decreasing with the number of previously submitted bids. This suggests that as bidders become more experienced over time, they learn to participate less often in penny auctions. 17 Observation 2: More experienced bidders are less likely to enter in new auctions. 1 5 Given that the participation decision occurs at a given moment in time (when the bidder submits her …rst bid in a given auction), we have computed the number of unique bidders and the HHI of unique bidders' bids in that auction until that point in time -e¤ectively measuring potential 'perceived' competition up to the point where the bidder decides to participate. If the bidder decides not to participate, we use the number of unique bidders and HHI of unique bidders'bids at the end of the auction. 1 6 The marginal e¤ects appear to be very small, but one must bear in mind that 98.8% of the observations for the dependent variable ('participate') take on the value of 0, that is, we only observe 176,908 bidder-auction participations (see Table 7 ) in a total of 15,314,000 possible combinations. Therefore, although the marginal e¤ects (evaluated at the mean) are small, they entail rather more noticeable percentage increases in the participation probability. 1 7 In addition, the number of auctions previously won has a positive coe¢ cient, which implies that previous auction wins have a positive e¤ect on the probability of participating in subsequent auctions. Finally, perceived competition (measured through the number of unique bidders until the participation decision) has a negative e¤ect on the participation probability. However, unique bidders'bid concentration has the opposite e¤ect: that is, a higher concentration of bids (which could be interpreted as a 'seriousness of competition' indicator) actually increases the probability of participation.
Observation 3:
The higher is the number of simultaneous auctions, the lower is the probability of entering an auction.
Individual pseudo-hazard rates
We have also adopted Augenblick's (2016) methodology to estimate individual-level pseudo hazard rates, which are de…ned as the probability that an individual exits an auction given the number of bids she has already submitted up to that point. Therefore, we have created a dummy variable 'leave' which is equal to 1 if a bidder's bid in an auction is her last bid in that auction and 0 otherwise. We have then estimated a random-e¤ects probit model for two di¤erent speci…cations. Under a second speci…cation, we have followed Augenblick (2016) by adding an interaction variable between experience (number of previously submitted bids) and the number of bids placed in the auction. We have also interacted simultaneous auction participation with the number of bids placed in the auction. Finally, we have also interacted the …rst hour dummy variable with experience and the number of simultaneous auctions in which the bidder is participating. Table 2 presents the results as marginal e¤ects evaluated at the mean.
First, the coe¢ cient on the average number of simultaneous auctions is positive and statistically 19 Third, the sunk cost fallacy is present: the probability of leaving the auction decreases with the number of bids already placed by the bidder in that auction. By contrast, participation in simultaneous auctions increases the drop out probability, as does experience. Fourth, we …nd that bidder experience does tend to reduce the e¤ect of an additional bid on the probability of leaving the auction (interaction term between experience and the number of bids submitted in the second column), that is, it alleviates the sunk cost fallacy, a result which is similar to that obtained by Augenblick (2016) . Interestingly, participation in multiple simultaneous auctions also appears to have an important role towards alleviating the sunk cost fallacy, as the interaction variable between simultaneous auction participation and the number of bids submitted has a positive (and signi…cant) coe¢ cient (second column).
Observation 4:
There is evidence of behavioral spillovers, some of which consist of vertical and horizontal learning e¤ ects. Both types of learning contribute to alleviating the sunk cost fallacy.
Individual level analysis
In order to gain a better understanding of bidding behavior, we now turn our attention to individual bidders and to the possible existence of a positive relationship between bidder surplus and experience. 20 We explore the issue in more detail by calculating total auction surplus for each bidder-auction combination and then regress it on several variables of interest using OLS. Table 3 reports the results. The …rst two columns refer to a generic speci…cation (with and without bidder-speci…c …xed e¤ects) where a bidder's surplus in an auction may be explained by a quadratic function of experience (measured through the number of previously submitted bids), a quadratic function of the number of simultaneous auctions in which the bidder is participating, a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if a particular bidder has won that speci…c auction and two measures of bidding competition (the number of unique bidders in that auction until the bidder in question decides to quit and a HHI index of those unique bidders'bids).
In both speci…cations, experience exhibits a broadly negative relationship with surpluses, whilst participation in simultaneous auctions has a broadly positive impact on surplus. Evaluated at the mean, the marginal e¤ect of experience on surplus under both speci…cations is negative; in addition, it is negative for almost all experience levels under column 1's speci…cation and only becomes positive for very high experience levels (99th percentile). Also evaluated at the mean, the marginal e¤ect of simultaneous auction participation on surplus is positive; however, it becomes negative for high levels of simultaneous auction participation (4th quartile).
These results are largely consistent with earlier literature and show that experience and simultaneous auction participation induce di¤erent bidder responses in the bidding process. Some factors could help explain why more experienced bidders exhibit a di¤erent bidding behavior and we look at them under the speci…cations of the 3rd and 4th columns (with and without bidder-speci…c …xed e¤ects) of Table 3 . For example, both Augenblick (2016) and Goodman (2012) identify bidding runs as a potential signaling mechanism through which a bidder signals her commitment and interest in winning the auction. In our data, once bidder-speci…c …xed e¤ects are considered, such bidding streak episodes do not appear to a¤ect surpluses in a signi…cant way. 21 In addition, we follow Goodman (2012) and introduce a quadratic function of own bid proportion in total auction bids -possibly a signaling device used by more experienced bidders. We …nd that for 99.7% of bidder-auction observations, own bid proportion has a negative e¤ect on auction surplus. 22 First hour bids may be particularly e¤ective signaling devices, as they allow for reputation e¤ects to be established early in the auction (Goodman, 2012) . Therefore, we have also included as potential explanatory variables the number of …rst hour bids and the proportion of a bidder's …rst hour bids in total …rst hour bids and …nd that, similarly to Goodman (2012), …rst hour bids appear to be a useful and e¤ective signaling mechanism. 23 Importantly, with the exception of …rst hour bids, these signaling strategies are rather ine¤ective.
When they are taken into account (3rd and 4th column of Table 3 ), the marginal e¤ect of experience on surplus is not as high (in absolute value) as in columns 1 and 2, but remains negative for virtually all experience levels. At the same time, the positive marginal e¤ect on surplus of simultaneous auction participation is higher than in columns 1 and 2, further reinforcing the previous result that this is a much more e¤ective learning tool.
Observation 5: Simultaneous participation in multiple auctions (horizontal learning) is a more e¤ ective learning mechanism than bidding over time within and across auctions.
Robustness of results
Budget constraints
The participation of bidders in simultaneous auctions raises the possibility that they may be allocating a …xed budget across auctions, in the vein of Colonel Blotto games, a constant-sum game in which two players simultaneously distribute forces across n battle…elds and, within each battle…eld, the player who has allocated a higher force wins (see Roberson, 2006 , or Hart, 2008 . 24 There are three notable di¤erences between Colonel Blotto games and penny auctions: (i) in Colonel Blotto games, the chosen strategy has an opportunity cost (the potential bene…t of using a force in a di¤erent battle…eld) whilst in penny auctions there is a direct bidding cost; (ii) the Colonel Blotto game is a static constant-sum game whilst penny auctions are dynamic non constant-sum games; 2 3 The number of …rst hour bids attempts to capture absolute reputation signals, whilst the proportion of a bidder's …rst hour bids attempts to capture relative reputation signals. We …nd that the marginal e¤ect of an additional …rst hour bid is negative (and larger, in absolute value, than e0.50, the bid cost) but the marginal e¤ect of a bidder's …rst hour bid proportion is positive. When the latter is evaluated at the mean, the marginal e¤ect of an additional bid is very close to the bid cost (e0.52). This suggests that provided the proportion of a bidder's …rst hour bids is relatively high (certainly higher than the mean), there may be an expectation of a net positive marginal e¤ect on surplus of …rst hour bids (insofar as the expected surplus gain through a …rst hour bid is higher than the bid cost), that is, …rst hour bids appear to be a useful and e¤ective signaling mechanism. 2 4 We would like to thank an associate editor and an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of analysis.
(iii) and in Colonel Blotto games, the …nal (non-negative) payo¤ is the proportion on wins across battle…elds (regardless of the force levels allocated to each battle…eld), whilst in penny auctions the …nal payo¤ crucially depends on the overall bid costs across all auctions.
Nevertheless, a relevant similarity is that bidders in penny auctions may be budget constrained when choosing their strategies and it is important to test whether that is the case. The data does not allow for a direct test and we have thus followed an indirect approach. First, within each auction week, we assume that budget constraints may a¤ect bidding behavior on a daily basis, that is, the behavior of bidder i in auction day t is a¤ected by her decisions (and total …nancial expenditure) in day t 1: Second, we assume that bidders are not …nancially constrained across auction weeks. 25 With this framework in mind, we use the bid level database and calculate, for each bidder and for each auction day in which she was active, bidder-speci…c and auction day-speci…c variables (in total, 80,349 active bidder-auction day observations). 26 Our general approach was the following: does a bidder's choice of (i) how many bids to place or (ii) the total number of auctions in which she participates depend on other bidder-speci…c or auction day-speci…c variables, including the previous day's total …nancial expenditure (a proxy for the possible existence of a budget constraint)? To answer this question, we have implemented two speci…cations. In a …rst speci…cation, we have expanded our dataset to include all 'inactive' auction days which immediately follow an 'active' auction day because, if a bidder is …nancially constrained, it may be that exhausting the available funds in day t makes her not bid in day t + 1:
This yields a total number of 131,089 bidder-auction day observations. Because of the large number of zeros for the dependent variable ((i) or (ii)), we conducted a tobit regression with clustered (by 2 5 This strikes us as sensible, because auctions are typically conducted on a monthly basis; that is, roughly a month goes by between auction weeks. 2 6 The bidder-speci…c variables are (i) the total number of bids placed, (ii) the total number of auctions in which she has participated, (iii) the total …nancial expenditure incurred (which includes bid costs as well as the …nal auction price if she has won an auction) and (iv) the number of previous auction wins. We have also created lagged variables for (ii) and (iii). The auction day-speci…c variables are: the total number of auctions, the average retail price of all items to be auctioned during the day, the number of auctions for each item brand and for each item type. Table 4 . In a second speci…cation, we have only resorted to the active bidder-auction day data and performed a …xed-e¤ects (FE) regression. This is presented as 'FE (i)'and 'FE (ii)'in Table 4 .
When the dependent variable is the total number of auctions in which the bidder participates, the …nancial expenditure in the previous day yields a positive and signi…cant (albeit small) or insigni…cant e¤ect, in the tobit (ii) and FE (ii) models respectively. That is, bidders do not appear to have daily …nancial constraints in what concerns their choice of how many auctions to participate in. When the dependent variable is the total number of bids placed, the previous day's …nancial expenditure appears with a positive or negative (signi…cant) coe¢ cient in the tobit (i) and FE (i) models respectively. 27 The latter is the only model for which the existence of a daily …nancial constraint could not be rejected, although the marginal impact is rather small. 28
Observation 6: Bidder behavior does not seem to be a¤ ected by …nancial constraints.
Possible di¤erences in bidder strategies
Another possible concern with our results is whether the e¤ect of participating in multiple simultaneous auctions is truly a learning e¤ect. 29 Indeed, di¤erent types of bidders may be using di¤erent are bidders who have only submitted one bid in one single auction. Table 5 summarizes some interesting descriptive statistics (averages for each bidder category).
First, most bidders are simultaneous bidders (68%) and account for a very large proportion of all submitted bids (92%). Single bid bidders are relatively few (12%) and seasoned bidders (21%) account for a very small proportion of all submitted bids (7.5%). Second, simultaneous bidders participate in more auctions than seasoned bidders (6.3 vs. 1.4) but submit relatively fewer bids (5.1 vs. 6.9). Therefore, overall, simultaneous bidders submit a larger number of bids across all auctions than seasoned bidders (34 vs. 9) mainly because they participate in more auctions. Third, simultaneous bidders are much more experienced at the time when they submit their …rst auction bid and win slightly more often, despite participating in auctions for items with relatively lower retail prices. Fourth, simultaneous bidders submit their …rst bid at a time when fewer unique bidders have already submitted bids and submit relatively fewer …rst hour bids.
Leaving aside the case of single bid bidders, this allows us to conjecture that although there are some di¤erences between simultaneous and seasoned bidders, the main di¤erence appears to be related to the number of auctions in which they participate and their experience when they make the and indicate that, for simultaneous bidders, the sunk cost fallacy is present, but learning e¤ects -both through experience as well as through participation in simultaneous auctions -are rather helpful in mitigating its e¤ects, thus broadly con…rming the results presented in Section 4.2.2.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper contributes to the emerging empirical evidence on penny auctions, an auction format which typically raises signi…cantly higher revenue than the underlying market value of the auctioned item. Our particular interest is the e¤ect of learning over time and across auctions as bidders become more experienced. In the dataset we have used, possibly because it is related to a relatively more homogeneous set of products than that used by earlier literature, pro…t margins are very high: on average, 219%. We …nd that, using auction-level data, the standard supply and demand variables have the expected e¤ects on …nal auction prices: increased supply (through a higher number of penny auctions occurring simultaneously) reduces …nal auction prices, whilst increased demand (through a higher number of unique bidders) increases them. In addition, …rst hour bidding activity contributes positively towards higher auction prices, to the bene…t of the auctioneer.
Using bid-level data, we …nd that more experienced bidders learn to participate less often in penny auctions and, as one would expect, the participation decision is negatively in ‡uenced by perceived competition. We also …nd evidence of the sunk cost fallacy, identi…ed by Augenblick (2016): bidders are more reluctant to drop out the higher is the number of bids they have already submitted. Experience acquired through bids submitted in one or more auctions over time does alleviate the sunk cost fallacy, but participation in multiple simultaneous auctions emerges as a signi…cantly more e¤ective learning mechanism. Therefore, we …nd evidence of behavioral spillovers, some of which appear to be learning e¤ects. Looking at individual auction surplus con…rms these results: experience exhibits a negative relationship with surplus, but participation in simultaneous auctions is associated with higher surpluses. Signaling and reputation-building strategies do appear to be used, but, with the exception of …rst hour bids, with little success in terms of outcomes.
Although our penny auction data has some limitations -for instance, it does not allow us to use bidder sophistication indicators such as those used by Wang and Xu (2012) -and is certainly smaller than that used by previous authors, it is su¢ ciently homogeneous to present a coherent picture of bidding behavior in penny auctions. Our most striking …nding is that 'horizontal learning'(within a time window but through bid submission or participation in more than one simultaneous auction)
is a much more e¤ective learning mechanism than 'vertical learning' (through bid submission or auction participation over time). This, to the best of our knowledge, is a novel result in the penny and 'horizontal'learning e¤ects clearly suggests that a theoretical extension to Augenblick's (2016) model which incorporates these two features is warranted. Such a model would yield equilibrium predictions for the role played by each type of learning e¤ect, which could then be reconciled with our empirical results. These are likely to be the next steps in our research.
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